The Tragedy of the Greek Debt Crisis: To Be Done With Judgment by Banalopoulou, Christina
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Since the first memorandum “agreement” between Greece and its international creditors—the 
European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)—the “tragedy of the Greek debt crisis” has become one of the most popular narratives that 
frame Greece’s condition of indebtedness. Representatives of the Greek joint government of 
SYRIZA-ANEL, of Greece’s creditors, of Greece’s official opposition, members of the Parliament of 
Greece, members of the European Parliament, journalists, activists, and so forth, all use notions of 
“tragedy” in order to associate the indebtization of Greece with what appears to be a “debt crisis.”  
Highlighting the interplay between appearances of “debt crisis” and notions of tragedy as its point 
of departure, the first section of this essay builds on Nietzsche’s thought and introduces a rigorous 
philosophy of tragedy that understands what appears to be a “debt crisis” as, in fact, a crisis of the 
creditor’s capacity to appropriate their debtor. For Nietzsche, in order for the creditor to find new 
ways to appropriate their debtor, the creditor stages a series of acts of judgment (κρίσις) that 
introduce masks and appearances of their debtor’s redemption. Drawing upon the interplay 
between the notion of mask and its performative capacities, Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy 
frames redemption in terms of an appearance and an illusion that conceals and perpetuates the 
non-resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor. Nietzsche’s emphasis on the 
interrelations between masks of redemption and the reproduction of creditor/debtor power 
differentials, allow me to argue that Nietzsche’s works on tragedy lay the ground for the emergence 
of becomings that are beyond indebtization, judgment and redemption.  
In the second section of this essay I make the case that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari draw upon 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy in order to grasp the interdependencies between capitalistic 
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modes of production and the production of infinite debt. I argue that just like redemption in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy, exchange in Deleuze and Guattari introduces appearances of 
equalization that render debt infinite. I closely examine how, within frames of capitalistic 
production, the interdependencies between the production of infinite debt and appearances of 
exchange give capital the opportunity to generate itself from credit.  
In the third section of this essay I build on Deleuze and Guattari's readings of Nietzsche's 
philosophy of tragedy and on Maurizio Lazzarato's works on Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari 
and I argue that what appears to be a “Greek debt crisis” is a crisis of capital’s capacity to secure its 
growth. I understand the austerity projects that were launched in Europe of the so-called financial 
crisis of 2008–9 as capital’s experimentations with new ways of exploitation. In the fourth and final 
section of this essay I place particular emphasis on the “YES” and “NO” demonstrations that 
occurred two days before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015. I make the case that while the 
“YES” demonstration reenacted the infinitization of Greece’s indebtedness to its creditors, the “NO” 
demonstration celebrated collective conceptualizations of politics that exceed debt and austerity.  
If the indebtization of Greece builds on appearances of debt resolution then we need scholarship 
that grasps the interconnections between the performative capacities of these appearances and 
what is often promoted and experienced as “the reality” of indebted Greece. In What is Philosophy? 
(1994), Deleuze and Guattari call for a philosophy that profits from “donning a mask” (43) by turning 
the force of the mask—a force that, I contend, is both theatrical and performative—towards the 
mask itself. From this point of view, the “task” of philosophy is to keep scattering the mask into 
multiple masks by continuously dressing it up. As a scholarship concerned with the common 
grounds between performance and philosophy, Performance Philosophy not only sheds light on 
the interconnections between the “real” aspects of the mask and the masked aspects of “reality” 
but also grasps the revolutionary potentialities that the scattering of the mask into multiple masks 
entails. In the comments that follow I introduce a philosophy of tragedy that draws upon the works 
of Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari and that, I argue, understands debt resolution as a mask 
the performative capacities of which are linked to the reproduction of the asymmetries between 
Greece and its international creditors. I trace the disruption of these asymmetries in the diffusion 
of the masks of redemption into multiple masks that move beyond notions of resolution.  
Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Tragedy and Performances of Redemption  
In The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche introduces a philosophy of tragedy 
that grasps that redemption can often perform as an illusion, a mask, and an appearance of 
resolution that conceals and perpetuates the non-resolvability of the power relations between a 
creditor and a debtor. From this point of view, the relation between resolution and the non-
resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor is not a relation of opposition or 
contradiction. The masks and appearances of resolution are part of the production of the 
creditor/debtor power differentials.  
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The notion of “redemption by illusion” first appears in The Birth of Tragedy ([1872] 1993) where 
Nietzsche conceptualizes attic tragedy in terms of two forces: the Apolline and the Dionysiac. 
Apollo is the one who finds “pleasure” and “delight” in “longing for illusion and for redemption by 
illusion” (24). Additionally, according to Nietzsche, that illusion performs as if it is not an illusion but 
reality. Nietzsche writes “an illusion that we, utterly caught up in it and consisting of it—as a 
continuous becoming in time, space and causality, in other words—are required to see as empirical 
reality” (24). However, this grasp of illusionary redemption as appearances and performances of 
reality does not imply that the destruction of the illusion will reveal a supposed actual reality that 
lies underneath.  
On the contrary, for Nietzsche the disruption of the Apolline “redemption by illusion” can only 
emerge from the Dionysiac affirmation of the Apolline mask. The force of Dionysus is a force that 
affirms that redemption is an illusion that performs as the one and only reality that there is. As 
Nietzsche writes, with Dionysus “the spell […] is broken” (71). However, the force of Dionysus is not 
negatively defined by and through the destruction of the Apolline illusion. Dionysus affirms that 
the Apolline illusion is just a mask (and not the only empirical reality that exists), not through the 
destruction of the one mask, but through the creation of multiple masks. The destruction of the 
Apolline mask is a contingent outcome of the multiplicities of masks that Dionysus creates.  
If the destruction of the Apolline “redemption by illusion” occurs, it occurs because of the Dionysiac 
“excess” of masks and “multiplicities of figures” (51). For Nietzsche the “doctrine of tragedy” (52) 
lies in this continuous interplay between “the Apolline deception […] which has the effect of 
relieving us of the burden of Dionysiac surge and excess” (103)—the Dionysiac excess becomes a 
burden since Dionysus affirms that redemption is by design illusionary and thus unreachable—
and the Dionysiac excess and multiplicities of masks that, as Nietzsche writes, “is capable of 
intensifying Apolline effects” (102) that regard the effects of the mask. Tragedy is a continuous and 
simultaneous dramatization of illusions of redemption in the making (Apollo) and of the scattering 
of these illusions that emerges from the excessive multiplicities of masks that affirm the illusionary 
foundations of redemption (Dionysus).  
What Nietzsche leaves implicit in The Birth of Tragedy, and makes more explicit when he revisits his 
philosophy of tragedy in The Genealogy of Morals ([1887] 2013), is that redemption performs as a 
seeming appearance and an elusive promise of resolution that conceals, produces and 
perpetuates the non-resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor. In The Genealogy 
of Morals, the Apolline notion of “redemption by illusion” that was introduced in The Birth of Tragedy 
becomes “the (debtor’s) impossibility of paying the debt” (62). Debt resolution becomes an 
“adamantine impossibility” (62) so that debt is rendered unpayable and the power of the creditor 
over the debtor is never challenged.  
The non-resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor are hidden and concealed 
beneath appearances and seeming promises of resolution that, nevertheless, remain elusive. For 
Nietzsche “it is at this juncture that the very hope of an eventual redemption has to put itself once 
for all into the prison of pessimism, it is at this juncture that the eye has to recoil and rebound in 
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despair from off an adamantine impossibility” (61). Once the debtor affirms that debt resolution 
performs as a mask in order to never be reached—it is the unreachability of redemption that 
Nietzsche describes as “the prison of pessimism”—then the debtor will turn both against 
themselves and the creditor (62). The debtor will no longer define themselves through notions of 
impossible redemption and the creditor will no longer be able to extract profit from imposing 
unpayable debt onto the debtor.  
Tragedy dramatizes how the creditor imposes excess of credit onto their debtor. The creditor’s 
goal is to bond their debtor and perpetuate the non-resolvable power relations between them. 
Earlier I argued that Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy grasps that redemption performs as a mask 
that produces and reproduces unpayable debt. Un-payable debt needs to appear as concrete 
debt—in order to introduce the possibility of its resolution—and simultaneously to perform in 
abstract terms—to turn continuously that possibility (even when that possibility occurs) into what 
Nietzsche described as an “adamantine impossibility.”  
The debtor is evaluated by their creditor both for their ability to keep paying without ever fully 
repaying their debt and for valuing their indebtedness to their creditors. The creditor not only 
evaluates their debtor’s value and but also judges their debtor’s values of values. For Nietzsche 
these acts of judgment carry a “double distinction: first, the relatively permanent element, the 
custom, the act, the ‘drama’ a certain rigid sequence of methods of procedure; on the other hand, 
the fluid element, the meaning, the end, the expectation which is attached to the operation of such 
procedure” (52). The “relatively permanent element,” the “drama,” the “act” regards the staging of 
processes of evaluation that build on appearances of concreteness. The “fluid element of the 
expectation” regards acts of judgment that conceal beneath appearances of concreteness the fact 
that are founded on abstract values of values.  
For Nietzsche the interplay between the “permanent procedures” of evaluation and the “fluid 
expectations” of judgment provides the debtor with a memory of their “debt” (40). Because of this 
mnemonic production the debtor remembers not only their promise to endlessly repay an 
unpayable debt but also the creditor’s elusive promise to redeem them. As a result both the non-
resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor, and the debt that these relations 
produce are carried to infinity.  
Tragedy is the worst enemy of the creditor’s power over their debtor because it dramatizes the 
diffusion of these masks of concreteness into more masks of abstraction. To sum up, Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of tragedy grasps that redemption performs as an illusion, an appearance, and an 
elusive promise of resolution of a so-called debt crisis that builds on series of acts of judgment. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche’s works on tragedy demonstrate how these acts of judgment conceal their 
basis on abstraction—abstraction that can also be understood as the values of values—beneath 
masks of concreteness. 
From this point of view, tragedy dramatizes both the theatricality of redemption—a theatricality 
that regards the performance of redemption as mask and illusion—and the performative 
capacities and potentialities of redemption that regard the interdependencies between masks of 
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resolution and the reproduction of the asymmetries between a creditor and a debtor. I contend 
that for Nietzsche it is the affirmation that the performative force of redemption draws its 
momentum from a mask, an appearance, and an illusion, that entails revolutionary potentialities. 
From this point of view, revolution occurs not when the performative capacities of a mask are 
disrupted or even appropriated but when the mask is affirmed as a mask and is diffused to 
multiplicities of masks.  
Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy demonstrates that when it comes to redemption and conditions 
of indebtedness the affirmation of debt resolution as a mask lays the ground for the emergence 
of becomings that are beyond indebtization, calculability, and judgment. In Labor of Dionysus: A 
Critique of the State-Form (1994), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that “the many 
contemporary attempts to employ ‘performance’ or ‘performativity’ as a paradigm for social 
analysis and social practice […] highlights the social importance of signifying or discursive practices” 
but cannot grasp “value-creating practices,” or, in other words, “the production of production” (8). 
Contrary to Hardt and Negri, in this section I made the case that Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy 
grasps the interdependencies between the production of values and performances of redemption. 
The next section builds on Deleuze and Guattari’s readings of Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy in 
order to grasp the links between appearances of debt resolution, the production of the non-
resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor, and capitalism. Connecting this 
theorization back to the Greek situation I contend that the indebtization of Greece builds on masks 
of debt resolution that reproduce the asymmetries between Greece and its creditors.  
Deleuze, Guattari and the Tragedy of Capitalism  
For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, the production of the asymmetries between a creditor and a 
debtor that Nietzsche grasps in his philosophy of tragedy also understands how capitalistic modes 
of production often perform. In the previous section I demonstrated that for Nietzsche tragedy is 
the dramatization of the affirmation that redemption is an illusion that “needs to be out once for 
all into the prison of pessimism” (Nietzsche [1872] 2003, 61) in order to stop reproducing the 
asymmetries between a creditor and a debtor. In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Deleuze and Guattari build on Nietzsche and argue that, within frames of capitalism, the non-
resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor remain hidden beneath appearances 
of exchange. Just like redemption in Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy, exchange in Anti-Oedipus 
introduces elusive promises of equality in order to reproduce inequality. The tragedy of Anti-
Oedipus lies in Deleuze and Guattari’s multiple, ongoing, and restless calls for understanding 
exchange as an appearance that perpetuates asymmetries.  
According to Deleuze and Guattari understanding the irresolvable asymmetries between a creditor 
and a debtor in relation to exchange is one of Nietzsche’s most important contributions to theories 
of contemporary capitalism. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari argue that, “Nietzsche’s On the 
Genealogy of Morals […] is an attempt—and a success without equal—at interpreting economy in 
terms of debt, in the debtor-creditor relationship, by eliminating every consideration of exchange” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 180). However, every consideration of exchange as a process of 
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equalization needs to be “eliminated” because what remains is the deceptive performance of 
exchange. 
Just like Nietzsche wanted to put once and for all the illusion of redemption into a “prison of 
pessimism,” Deleuze and Guattari want to eliminate once and for all the appearance and the 
elusive promise of exchange that implies equalization. For Deleuze and Guattari, “Exchange is only 
an appearance: each partner or group assesses the value of the last receivable object (limit-object), 
and the apparent equivalence derives from that” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 439). The 
“assessment” of the pre-existing or pre-established value—the value of the last receivable object—
does not transform an unequal distribution to an equal distribution. On the contrary it reproduces 
the asymmetrical relations between the involved parties. This does not mean that the asymmetries 
remain the same since mobility within the power relations between the involved parties might 
occur, but that asymmetry is reproduced. 
Similarly to the mask of redemption, the appearance of exchange carries performative 
potentialities. The appearance of exchange does not perform on a level of artificiality or similitude 
that is opposed to reality. On the contrary the appearance of exchange acts upon lived experience 
by reproducing debt. Deleuze and Guattari are very clear about that: “Far from being a mere 
imitator, the artisan of the signs accomplishes a work” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 189). The work 
that “the artisan of the signs” (i.e., the appearance of exchange) accomplishes is the production 
and reproduction of debt: “Far from being an appearance assumed by exchange, debt is (an) 
immediate effect” (180). The most important characteristic of the debt that is produced by 
appearances of exchange is that it is irresolvable and infinite. 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy grasps that what appears to be an accumulation of debt, or, in 
other words a debt crisis, is an excess of credit built on judgment (krisis). Additionally, according to 
Nietzsche, the abstract aspect of judgment—“the fluid element and expectation” as Nietzsche 
called it—is concealed beneath the “drama,” and the “act” of concreteness. Drawing upon 
Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari understand credit excess—“money begetting money” (227) as they 
call it—and thus irresolvable debt and debt crises as integral parts of capitalistic modes of 
production. For Deleuze and Guattari capitalism reinvents itself every time “debt is rendered 
infinite” (197) through simultaneously introducing the appearance of and eliminating any 
possibility for a “final discharge” (132). Within frames of capitalism, “the infinite creditor and infinite 
credit have replaced the blocks of mobile and finite debt […] the creditor has not yet lent while the 
debtor never quits repaying” (197). Debt remains infinite and the power relations between a 
creditor and a debtor infinitely irresolvable.  
The infinitization of debt and thus of the asymmetries between a creditor and a debtor is so 
important to reinventions of capitalism because it enables capital to create and generate more 
capital without necessarily relying on material production. Infinite credit is a form of production 
that “operates less on a quantity of labor than by a complex qualitative process” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 492). Deleuze and Guattari are arguing that the production of infinite credit 
appropriates, and does not oppose, labor. Deleuze and Guattari understand this process of 
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appropriation as “anti-production (production that builds on excess of credit) operating 
retroactively on (se rabattre sur) productive forms and appropriate them” (31). The most important 
characteristic of anti-production is that it “does not oppose production […] on the contrary, it 
insinuates itself everywhere in the productive machine and becomes firmly wedded to it in order 
to regulate its productivity and realize surplus value” (235). Production and anti-production are 
part of the endless production of capital generating capital.  
Capital generating capital or, echoing Deleuze and Guattari, “money begetting money,” builds on 
the appropriation of production by anti-production. According to Deleuze and Guattari the 
appropriation of production by anti-production is the “signs of the power of capital, flows of 
financing, a system of differential quotients of production that bear witness to a prospective force 
or to a long-term evaluation, not realizable hic et nunc, and functioning as an axiomatic of abstract 
quantities” (228). In order for the evaluation that defines the profit that emerges from profit to 
remain a “long-term” and open-ended evaluation it needs to perform in terms of judgment. 
Therefore, in order to produce infinite debt, capitalistic modes of production not only require 
masks of debt resolution and appearances of “equalizing” exchange but also a theatre of judgment 
of the debtor by their creditor.  
For Deleuze it is the infinitization of debt and the “long-term” evaluation of the debtor by their 
creditor—a process that is designed to remain infinitely without a telos while the process itself 
becomes the telos—that stages a theatre of judgment. In “To Have Done With Judgment”—an essay 
in which Deleuze reflects both on Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy and Antonin Artaud’s radio 
play To Have Done With the Judgment of God (1947)—Deleuze argues that “it is not as if the judgment 
itself were postponed, put off until tomorrow, pushed back to infinity; on the contrary, it is the act 
of postponing, of carrying to infinity, that makes judgment possible. The condition of judgment lies 
in a supposed relation between existence and the infinite order of time” (Deleuze 1997, 127). In 
Anti-Oedipus this relation between existence and the infinite order of time—a relation that forms 
existence in terms of the creditor/debtor asymmetries—becomes a relation of appropriation of 
anti-production by production.  
In order for this relation to remain, it needs to “create a memory for a man”: a memory according 
to which all modes of existence are calculable, redeemable, and shaped by and within the power 
relations between a creditor and a debtor. Drawing upon Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari argue 
that this production of memory of calculable existence performs in terms of “marking” and 
“inscription.” In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues that in order for any kind of power 
relations to last—especially the ones between a creditor and a debtor—a “system of mnemonics” 
is required. For Nietzsche “something is burnt in so as to remain in [man’s] memory: only that 
which never stops hurting remains in [their] memory” (Nietzsche [1872] 2003, 37). Deleuze and 
Guattari understand this kind of production of memory as an “other memory, one that is collective, 
a memory of words and no longer a memory of things, a memory of signs and no longer of effects” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 145). This memory of “words” and “signs” is also a memory of masks 
that fuels the forgetting of the direct effects of the masks.  
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In the case of the non-resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor what needs to 
be remembered is the mask and the appearance of debt resolution and not the direct effect of the 
infinite debt that this mask produces. The production of infinite debt needs to be inscribed, marked 
and internalized in ways that it becomes forgotten as the only reality that can be. For Nietzsche, 
tragedy, understood as a continuous affirmation of the mask as a mask, can potentially disrupt the 
production of infinite debt. This affirmation is both cruel and celebratory. Celebratory because it 
disrupts the power relations between a creditor and a debtor by recognizing redemption as an 
illusion that carries performative capacities—for instance infinite debt—and cruel because it no 
longer hides behind “pleasurable” illusions that perpetuate pain by numbing it. Nietzsche writes 
“Without cruelty no feast” (Nietzsche [1872] 2003, 42). The cruelty of the feast involves the painfully 
“ecstatic”—the taking out of the condition of stasis—diffusion of the stasis of one mask to ongoing 
movements of multiplicities of masks.  
According to Deleuze, this cruel affirmation of the appearances as appearances that perform and 
produce direct effects is also found in Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty. In “To Have Done With 
Judgment” (1997), Deleuze writes “Artaud will give sublime developments to the system of cruelty 
[…] the system of cruelty expresses the finite relations of the existing body with the forces that 
affect it, whereas the doctrine of infinite debt determines the relationships of the immortal soul 
with judgments. The system of cruelty is everywhere opposed to the doctrine of judgment” (128). 
The next two sections closely investigate whether this system of cruelty that exceeds judgment and 
redemption can be found in indebted Greece and in what appears to be a “Greek debt crisis.”  
The Crisis/Krisis of Indebted Greece  
Since the launch of the euro in January 1999 the private banks of the eurozone’s core—Germany, 
France, Italy and the countries of the former Benelux—have been building their growth on the 
indebtization of the eurozone’s periphery: Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain also known as PIGS 
(Castells 2017, Galbraith 2016, Varoufakis 2016, Phillips 2014). In order to generate cheap debt in 
the periphery of the eurozone, the private banks of the eurozone’s core borrowed in US dollars at 
low rates and lent this money at higher rates to the eurozone’s periphery (Phillips 2014, 35). After 
the US financial crisis of 2008, the European credit bubble burst.  
Due to that burst, the capital that derived from the credit issued by the private banks of the 
eurozone could no longer increase its growth. In the previous section I made the case that what I 
understand as the “tragedy of capitalism” builds on Deleuze and Guattari’s understandings of the 
interdependencies between the profit that emerges from the generation of debt, or, in other words 
from credit, and the appropriation of production by anti-production. In Governing by Debt, also 
drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari, Maurizio Lazzarato (2015) makes the case that the roots of 
the crisis lie in the fact that capital could “no longer ensure new forms of 
exploitation/appropriation” (38). According to Lazzarato the causes of the co-called European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis do not lie in the inability of several eurozone member states to pay off their 
debts, as it often appears. On the contrary what appears to be a crisis of debt accumulation caused 
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by increased public spending is a crisis of excessive credit and, more particularly, a crisis of credit’s 
capacity to generate profit.  
However, credit’s inability to “increase in value” (38) is simultaneously an opportunity for credit, 
and also for the capital produced by credit, to use different means in order to grow. A crisis of the 
means of appropriation is simultaneously an opportunity for the exploration of new ways of 
appropriation. According to Deleuze and Guattari “capitalism […] was able to interpret the general 
principle according to which things work well only providing they break down, crises being ‘the 
means immanent to the capitalistic mode of production” (Deleuze 1983, 230). I contend that the 
austerity projects that were launched in Europe of the so-called financial crisis of 2008–9 were 
experimentations for the capital that derives from credit accumulation to find ways to keep 
securing its growth.  
In brief, austerity policies include heavy taxation, wage reductions, cuts in any kind of spending 
that involves the welfare programs, and privatizations. Lazzarato understands austerity policies as 
“forced levies” (2015, 39) that use secure heavy taxation in order to experiment with new ways of 
exploitation. Even though European austerity projects are promoted as necessary means for the 
indebted member states of the eurozone’s periphery to pay back their debts, austerity imposes 
more loans, heavy taxation, reduces wages, enforces privatizations, and annihilates welfare in 
order to bail out the banks since the banks are considered “too big to fail.” What appeared to be 
public debts are private debts that have been imposed to the taxpayer. From this point of view 
austerity becomes the “new” common ground between monetary experimentations and fiscal 
policies.  
In Anti-Oedipus—where I contend Deleuze and Guattari contextualize Nietzsche’s elaboration on 
the performative capacities of appearances of debt resolution to reproduce the non-resolvable 
power relations between a creditor and a debtor, within frames of capitalism—Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that taxation enhances the production of infinite debt and keeps the creditors alive. 
They write, “As if the Greeks1 had discovered in their own way what the Americans discovered after 
the New Deal: that heavy taxes are good for business. In a word money—the circulation of 
money—is the means for rendering the debt infinite” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 197). Austerity 
uses the heavy taxes that are imposed on the member states of the eurozone’s periphery in order 
to do “good” to the business of the creditors.  
Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari Lazzarato argues that, during the so-called financial crisis in 
Europe, heavy taxation was a way for capital to explore new means for its growth. According to 
Lazzarato, “During the crisis, taxation has served both to destroy the forms of (constant and 
variable) capital that fail to conform to the logic of financial valorization and, from this destruction, 
to establish a possible new phase of accumulation” (2015, 39). Financial valorization refers to 
capital assessing and expanding itself. What appears to be a “debt-crisis” is an opportunity for 
credit to overcome its burst and find new ways to appropriate production.  
The “Greek debt crisis” was an opportunity for the indebted banks of the eurozone to be saved. 
Especially since the first memorandum agreement—the first austerity package—between Greece 
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and its international creditors, public discourse is saturated with narratives of the so-called “Greek 
debt crisis” that are often associated with notions of tragedy. Advocates of austerity associate the 
“Greek debt crisis” with notions of tragedy in order to “legitimize” severe austerity measures as 
necessary and inevitable. However, the philosophy of tragedy that builds on Nietzsche and Deleuze 
and Guattari conceptualizes becomings that are beyond indebtization and disrupt the imposition 
of the supposedly “inevitable” austerity.  
Let’s take a closer look at what appears to be the “debt crisis” of Greece. In February 2010 the Greek 
governing party of PA.SO.K—an acronym that stands for Panhellenic Socialist Movement—
announced that the statistics regarding the debt of Greece had been falsified so that Greece could 
enter the euro area in 2001. In response to this “revelation” Troika—“the group of three”—was 
established in May 2010. Τroika was a committee containing representatives of the world’s 
international creditors. In the case of Greece these creditors were the EC, the ECB, and the IMF. 
The role of Troika was to evaluate and assess Greece’s implementation of the severe austerity 
measures, often promoted as economic adjustment programs, assistance or bailout packages, that 
come in the form of memorandum agreements, imposed by Greece’s international creditors. What 
is of particular importance is that Troika is not answerable to any elected government either on a 
national or on a European level.  
Between 2010 and the Greek snap elections of January 2015 Greece had signed two memorandum 
agreements and a series of complementary additions collectively called “medium-term budgetary 
framework” in exchange for loans that were literally more debt. Bridging Greece’s memoranda to 
the thought process that was elaborated in the previous sections I contend that in the case of 
Greece the elusive promise remained the same: Greece’s debt resolution “achieved” through the 
infinitization of debt. During the years of the two memorandum agreements Troika’s 
representatives kept coming to Greece in order to evaluate Greece’s “progress” regarding the 
implementation of the austerity measures imposed by its creditors.  
Public discourse often described Greece’s evaluations by Troika as “choreographies” staged on a 
theatre of judgment. Every time Troika came to Greece the streets were kept empty for the “safety” 
of its representatives. Troika’s representatives spent days behind the closed doors of the Greek 
ministries and administration buildings, and the results of the evaluations were announced as 
“facts” by the government. Every evaluation asked for more imposed debt, more wage reductions, 
more privatizations, more pension cuts, and less welfare. Every evaluation performed as an 
appearance and an elusive promise of debt resolution that reproduced the non-resolvable power 
relations between Greece and its international creditors. 
Echoing Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari, Troika’s evaluations were acts in an endless theatre 
of judgment where judgment is a way for the creditor to find new ways to exploit their debtor. In 
indebted Greece judgment became the solution to the crisis of appropriation. As one Greek 
etymology suggests κρίσις (krisis) is the activity of judgment the outcome of which is to be 
determined. However, in the case of the so-called “Greek debt crisis” krisis is transformed to a tool 
used by Greece’s creditors to experiment with their debtor’s exploitation. The crisis of the creditor’s 
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capacity to profit from their debtor entails a kind of krisis the outcome of which is not to be 
determined but it is always-already in favor of the creditor. The krisis of Greece as a debtor is part 
of a theatre of judgment staged by Greece’s creditors so that Greece’s indebtization continues. For 
Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari in order for the theatre of judgment to simultaneously be 
“carried to infinity” while also performing as the “final authority” it needs to be inscribed in memory. 
The memorandum agreements between Greece and its international creditors are produced and 
imposed memory that shapes existence merely in terms of the asymmetries between a creditor 
and a debtor.  
For Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari, the inscribed memory of judgment helps judgment 
perform on a level of infinity through appearances of finitude: the “final authority” as Deleuze calls 
it. The memoranda between Greece and its creditors set the scene for the theatre of judgment of 
Greece by its creditors; a theatre that uses appearances of debt resolution in order to infinitize 
Greece’s debt. What appears to be a “Greek debt crisis” is a crisis of debt’s appropriation by credit 
that relies on krisis (judgment) in order to overcome itself.  
Earlier I argued that according to Nietzsche, because it affirms masks as appearances that carry 
performative capacities, Dionysian tragedy can disrupt any theatre of judgment that builds on and 
reproduces the non-resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor. I also made the 
case that Deleuze and Guattari relate Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy to Artaud’s Theatre of 
Cruelty. According to the authors of Anti-Oedipus, both Nietzsche and Artaud conceptualize 
becomings that “escape judgment” (Deleuze 1997, 131). The question then that I contend needs to 
be addressed asks whether and how Greece can stage its own theatre of cruelty and escape 
judgment.  




to negation;  
and this point  
comes when they press me  
 
Antonin Artaud,  
To Have Done With the 
Judgment of God (1947) 
Endless austerity led to intense political turmoil. As a result, on December 29, 2014, the Greek 
parliament failed to elect a new president. The Greek snap elections of January 2015 were a direct 
result of this failure. The left party of SYRIZA—an acronym that stands for Greece’s radical left—
won the elections because of its promise and commitment not to sign a third memorandum 
agreement, to put an end to austerity, and to actualize political visions that are beyond politics of 
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debt. However SYRIZA did not form an absolute majority. As a result they collaborated with the 
right wing party of ANEL (Independent Greeks) in order to form a government.  
Between January and June 2015 the tensions between the newly elected joint government of 
SYRIZA-ANEL and Greece’s international creditors kept increasing. One of the most catalytic 
moments was when, during a joint press conference between the, at the time, Greek minister of 
finance Yianis Varoufakis, and the, also at the time, president of eurogroup2 and the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Varoufakis stated that “with this (Troika) if you 
want—and according to the European Parliament—implausibly-constructed committee we have 
no intention to cooperate. Thank you” (newsIT.gr 2015). Up to the eurogroup meeting that was 
scheduled for June 27, 2015, SYRIZA kept pushing for no austerity while Greece’s creditors kept 
pushing for more austerity.  
On June 28, 2015, the Greek Prime Minister and President of SYRIZA Alexis Tsipras froze the 
negotiations with Greece’s creditors and called for a Greek referendum scheduled for July 5, 2015. 
According to Tsipra’s announcement the referendum would ask the citizens of Greece whether 
they accept (ΝΑΙ, YES vote) or reject (ΟΧΙ, NO vote) the most recent proposal of austerity measures 
“suggested” by Greece’s international creditors. On Friday, July 3, 2015, two different and massive 
demonstrations were staged in the city of Athens: the ΝΑΙ (YES) demonstration and the OXI (NO) 
demonstration.  
The estimated numbers of the participants provided by the media vary, since the “accurate 
statistics” that referred to the demonstrations depended on the different political orientations of 
the individual media outlets. According to research that determined the participants based on the 
capacity of the occupied spaces, between 360,000 and 400,000 people participated in the “NO” and 
between 25,000 and 30,000 people participated in the “YES” demonstration. The “NO” 
demonstration was staged on Syntagma Square in Athens— the Square located directly in front of 
the Greek Parliament and that in Greek means “constitution.” Historically the Syntagma Square has 
staged various uprisings, protests, occupations, and demonstrations. Some of the largest and 
longest series of occupations occurred during the first two years of Greek austerity. Mostly known 
as Κίνημα Αγανακτισμένων Πολιτών (Movement of Indignant Citizens), between 2010 and 2012, 
thousands of people that had no ties to any political party and that wanted to directly challenge 
austerity and politics of debt had been living on the square in tents and self-organizing street 
performances, public festivals, strikes, protests, demonstrations, and so forth. Three years after 
the disappearance of the Indignant Citizens from the Syntagma Square, the “NO” demonstration 
refueled the anti-austerity movement in Greece.  
The “YES” demonstration took place at Παναθηναϊκό Στάδιο (Panathenaic Stadium) also known as 
Καλλιμάρμαρο (Kalimarmaro). As opposed to Syntagma’s long history of staging protests against 
European politics of austerity, Kalimarmaro performs as a reminder of Greece’s “Europeanness.” 
As the last Greek venue from where the Olympic flame is handed over to the country/host of the 
Olympic games, the Kalimarmaro is “admired” and “celebrated” as part of classic Greece and an 
“origin” of Western civilization. I contend that Greece’s indebtization is closely linked to the 
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construction of “classical Greece” as the “origin” of Western civilization. “Classic” Greece “helped” 
Greece to perform its “modernity” and “Europeanness” for the European gaze, and concealed its 
dependence upon its European creditors beneath narratives of independence. This however can 
be the topic of another paper.  
Going back to the two demonstrations, in spite of their major differences, the “NO” and “YES” 
demonstrations had one thing in common: they both moved beyond the communicated language 
of “no” and “yes.” While both the “NO” and the “YES” demonstrations were associated with either a 
“NO” or a “YES” answer to the question that the upcoming referendum was going to address, the 
“NO” demonstration became a celebration of politics beyond debt and austerity and thus beyond 
judgment and creditor/debtor power relations, and the “YES” demonstration became a reactionary 
response to that praxis of collective and public politics beyond conditions of indebtedness.  
For the “YES” demonstration any alternative conceptualization of politics that exceeds the non-
resolvable relations between a creditor and a debtor, or, more particularly that does not define 
Greece via and by these relations, would lead not only to the immediate exclusion of Greece from 
the eurozone—a process known as Grexit—but also to the exclusion of Greece from Europe. 
According to the “YES” demonstration Greece can be part of Europe as long as it remains indebted 
to its creditors and it conceals this relation of indebtedness beneath narratives of nationally 
oriented “independence.” The “YES We Are Staying in Europe” slogan of the “YES” demonstration 
not only indicated but also reproduced this perceived interdependency between “European” and 
indebted Greece.  
From this point of view the “YES” demonstration exceeded the seemingly affirmative “YES” by 
defining and shaping existence, and more particularly Greek citizenship, merely through the 
negatively charged position of the debtor in relation to their creditor. In this essay I made the case 
that Nietzsche understands tragedy as a potential disruption of the debtor’s judgment by their 
creditor. I argued that according to Deleuze and Guattari the common ground between Nietzsche’s 
tragedy and Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty lies in both tragedy and Theatre of Cruelty’s capacities to 
conceptualize and actualize becomings that exceed the asymmetries between a creditor and a 
debtor. I made the case that for Deleuze and Guattari the becomings that move beyond the non-
resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor can directly challenge the capitalistic 
modes of production that generate capital from credit.  
Drawing upon this thought process I contend that the “YES” demonstration reenacted a theatre of 
judgment that kept the memory of the debtor alive. Because of the affirmative appearance of the 
“YES” demonstration—which is not an affirmation of the appearance as an appearance but a 
continuation of the preexisting performative functions of the appearance—the “YES” 
demonstration re-performed, and thus reproduced, the non-resolvable power relations between 
Greece and its international creditors. Earlier I built on Deleuze and Guattari and Lazzarato in order 
to argue that what appears to be a “Greek debt crisis” is a crisis of the appropriation of Greece by 
its creditors. From this point of view the “YES” demonstration reminded Greece’s creditors that 
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they could continue their experimentation until they find new efficacious ways to appropriate their 
debtor.  
While the “YES” demonstration reenacted the infinitization of Greece’s indebtedness to its 
creditors, the “NO” demonstration celebrated collective conceptualizations of politics that exceed 
debt and austerity. Manifesting Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy and Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty, 
including Deleuze and Guattari’s readings of Nietzsche and Artaud, the “NO” demonstration 
affirmed any appearances of debt-resolution as masks that conceal and perpetuate the non-
resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor, and envisioned politics beyond 
notions of judgment. Put differently, the “NO” demonstration imagined becomings that are not 
defined through and by their negatively charged condition of indebtedness to their supposed 
creditors. The “NO” demonstration dramatized the collective imagination of becomings that exceed 
redemption by choosing to experience the cruelty of the effects of the appearance of debt-
resolution over the illusionary happiness of masks of redemption.  
One should take into serious consideration that after Tsipras’ call for the Greek referendum on 
June 28, 2015, the ESM stopped providing the Greek banks with money causing their immediate 
closure. On the day of the “NO” demonstration the banks had been closed for a week. Capital 
controls were introduced reducing the maximum amount for daily withdrawals down to 60 euros 
so that deposits did not get transferred to banks outside of Greece. As a result employees were 
not getting paid, grocery stores were running out of groceries, hospitals were under-functioning, 
and so forth. I contend that the 400,000 people that participated in the “NO” demonstration 
celebrated the praxis of envisioning politics beyond notions of debt and redemption not in spite of 
but because of this uncertainty. This, however, does not imply a relation of causality. On the 
contrary it understands the “NO” demonstration not as a reaction to but as a celebration of this 
uncertainty.  
The 400,000 people together with the dozens the representatives of the joint government SYRIZA-
ANEL and the dozens of artists that performed during the demonstration all affirmed and 
celebrated the shattering of the masks of debt resolution that infinitize Greece’s indebtedness to 
its creditors. The “NO” demonstration disrupted the production of memory of the debtor—a 
production that, as argued, builds on appearances of debt resolution—by remembering, 
experiencing, and celebrating the cruelty of the direct effects of masks of redemption. Even though 
representatives of Greece’s creditors, Greece’s official opposition, and the media kept arguing that 
the referendum would radically increase Greece’s debt, the “NO” demonstration celebrated the 
emergence of becomings beyond indebtedness and redemption.  
Earlier I argued that what appears to be a “Greek debt crisis” is a crisis of Greece’s appropriation 
by its creditors. I also made the case that Greek austerity was an experiment that tried to provide 
the creditors with new means of appropriation. Since the beginning of the closure of the banks on 
June 28, 2015, Greece became impossible to appropriate not because of an oppositional response 
to its creditors but because of experiencing time that is beyond the time of infinite debt and 
introducing becomings that are beyond notions of debt, judgment, and redemption.  
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According to the results of the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 the turnout was 62.5%: a turnout 
that far exceeded the turnout of the Greek snap legislative elections of January 2015, which was 
56.6%. Some 61.31% of the referendum’s voters voted “NO” rejecting the austerity measures 
“suggested” by Greece’s international creditors; 38.69% voted “YES” and only 5.8% of the votes were 
blank or invalid. In spite of Greek people’s vote and resistance—as described earlier the Greek 
banks had remained closed and thus money stopped circulating for approximately two and a half 
months—on July 13, 2015, Tsipras ended up agreeing to a third memorandum of understanding 
between Greece and Greece’s international creditors. On August 13, 2015, the Greek Parliament 
approved that memorandum agreement. 
Anti-Conclusion 
One could argue that the “NO” demonstration performed as a pressure valve that ended up 
reproducing the asymmetries between Greece and its international creditors. However, the “NO” 
demonstration was a collective celebration of not performing as a debtor within conditions of 
imposed indebtedness. The negation in that sentence is not a product of hetero-determination. 
On the contrary it emerges from the affirmation of existence beyond debt, judgment and 
redemption. To echo Deleuze, the negative aspect of not performing as a debtor is not the source 
but one of the many manifestations of becomings that exceed the non-resolvable power relations 
between a creditor and a debtor and becomings that are done with judgment.  
The emergence of becomings that are done with judgment is what remains of the “NO” 
demonstration. Many would say that what remains is not important since it never became 
structuralized. I contend otherwise for two reasons: one, because not having become 
structuralized means maintaining certain revolutionary potentialities that any kind of absorption 
by a structure—even the most radical one—would take away, and two, because we know from 
performance that what remains haunts and, just like the mask, what haunts performs.  
1 Deleuze and Guattari here refer to Michel Foucault’s research on certain tyrannies of Greece. According to the 
authors of Anti-Oedipus Foucault’s work demonstrates that in Greek tyrannies heavy taxes on the rich distribute 
money to the poor only to return more money back to the rich and to perpetuate the indebtization of the poor.  
2 eurogroup are series of informal meetings among the ministers of finance of the member states of the euro 
area that are both not minuted and not answerable to any kind of elected body 
Notes 
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